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Dissolving the self
Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution
George Deanea (georgejwdeane@gmail.com)
Abstract
Psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin, LSD and DMT are known to induce powerful alterations
in phenomenology. Perhaps of most philosophical and scientific interest is their capacity to
disrupt and even “dissolve” one of the most primary features of normal experience: that of
being a self. Such “peak” or “mystical” experiences are of increasing interest for their potentially
transformative therapeutic value. While empirical research is underway, a theoretical conception
of the mechanisms underpinning these experiences remains elusive. In the following paper,
psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution is accounted for within an active inference framework,
as a collapse in the “temporal thickness” of an agent’s deep temporal model, as a result of
lowered precision on high-level priors. The argument here is composed of three moves: first,
a view of the self-model is proposed as arising within a temporally deep generative model of
an embodied organism navigating an affordance landscape in the service of allostasis. Next,
a view of the action of psychedelics as lowering the precision of high-level priors within the
generative model is unpacked in terms of a high Bayesian learning rate. Finally, the relaxation of
high-level priors is argued to cause a “collapse” in the temporal thickness of the generative model,
resulting in a collapse in the self-model and a loss of the ordinary sense of being a self. This
account has implications for our understanding of ordinary self-consciousness and disruptions
in self-consciousness present in psychosis, autism, depression, and dissociative disorders. The
philosophical, theoretical and therapeutic implications of this account are touched upon.
Keywords
Active inference ∙ Consciousness ∙ Ego-dissolution ∙ Predictive processing ∙ Psychedelics ∙ Self-
model
This article is part of a special issue on “Radical disruptions of self-consciousness”,
edited by Thomas Metzinger and Raphaël Millière.
1 Introduction
Psychedelic (“mind-manifesting”) drugs are known to occasion radically altered
states of consciousness, including profound changes in sensory perception, emo-
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tion, cognition, time perception, and self-consciousness (Preller & Vollenweider,
2016). One of the most interesting of all of these effects is the experience of ego-
dissolution. Although the experience is notoriously difficult to articulate and even
considered ineffable, psychedelic researcher Stanislas Grof, who considers ego-
dissolution the “main objective” of psychedelic therapy, describes it as “an ecstatic
state, characterized by the loss of boundaries between the subject and the objec-
tive world, with ensuing feelings of unity with other people, nature, the entire Uni-
verse, and God” (Grof, 1980, p. 79).1 Ego-dissolution is of considerable philosoph-
ical and theoretical value for understanding selfhood and the nature of conscious-
ness (Letheby & Gerrans, 2017; Millière, 2017; Nour & Carhart-Harris, 2017).2 It is
also considered to be central to the therapeutic potential of psychedelics (Carhart-
Harris & Goodwin, 2017; see also Letheby, 2020, Limanowski & Friston, 2020, Se-
bastián, 2020, all in this special issue). Despite this, very little is known about the
mechanisms underpinning psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution.
“Predictive processing” theories of brain function (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010;
Wiese & Metzinger, 2017) have recently taken precedence in cognitive science,
affording a novel theoretical framework to approach cognitive phenomena. In
this paper I propose a novel account of ego-dissolution within an active inference
framework. To this end, I initially furnish an account of self-modelling within ac-
tive inference, where pre-reflective self-consciousness emerges in organisms as a
consequence of “temporal thickness”, the need to model the consequences of po-
tential actions over time (Friston, 2018). I then give an account of the action of
psychedelics within a predictive processing framework, unpacking the view that
psychedelics “relax” high-level priors (Carhart-Harris, 2019; Carhart-Harris & Fris-
ton, 2019) in terms of a high Bayesian learning rate (Hohwy, 2017; Mathys et al.,
2014). Finally, I argue that low precision at high-levels of the inferential hierarchy
results in a collapse of the temporal thickness of the generative model and the cor-
responding self-model, leading to the phenomenon known as ego-dissolution (see
also Limanowski & Friston, 2020, this issue).
2 The free energy principle
The Free Energy Principle (FEP) has the most ambitious explanatory scope of all
“predictive processing” style theoretical frameworks (Friston, 2010). It combines,
subsumes and links to several brain theories, including the Bayesian brain hypoth-
esis (Knill & Pouget, 2004), predictive coding (Mumford, 1992; Rao & Ballard, 1999),
efficient coding (Barlow, 2001) and reinforcement learning (Dayan & Daw, 2008).
The mathematics of the theory are complex and beyond the scope of this paper
(for a review see Buckley, Kim, McGregor, & Seth, 2017). According to the FEP,
1See https://www.erowid.org for over 20,000 “trip reports” of various psychoactive drugs, including
many descriptions of ego-dissolution.
2No particular theory of consciousness is assumed in this paper, but the proposal is considered
consistent with predictive processing approaches to consciousness (Clark, 2019; Hohwy, 2012).
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simply in virtue of existing, all organisms tend to minimise the entropy or dis-
persion of their states. This much is intuitive: the conditions that are viable for
an organism are fairly narrow – deviation from homeostatic bounds, such as hav-
ing a body temperature of 50 degrees centigrade, is incompatible with continued
existence. Organisms that fail to stay within their “species-specific window of vi-
ability” (Clark, 2013 p. 13) simply cease to exist. Life, on this account, resists the
tendency towards disorder imposed by the second law of thermodynamics, and
this principle applies at all levels – “from their gross morphology to fine details
of cortical microcircuitry as well as at timescales from the neuronal to the phy-
logenetic” (Seth & Tsakiris, 2018, p. 973). Organisms, then, must resist entropy,
the long-term average of (information-theoretic) surprise. Because this quantity
is beyond direct epistemic access to an organism, according to the FEP, organisms
minimise a proxy variable or upper bound – dubbed (variational) free energy. Free
energy (under some simplifying assumptions) is equivalent to precision-weighted
prediction error in predictive processing.
2.1 Predictive processing
On the predictive processing view, the brain has stored prior beliefs (in the form
of probability distributions) about the causes of sensory inputs in the world (Clark,
2013; Wiese & Metzinger, 2017). Prior beliefs are hierarchically organised, where
higher-levels encode predictions about representations at lower levels. Prediction
errors, arising from the discrepancy between the low-level predictions and incom-
ing sensory signals, are passed up the hierarchy, where higher-level predictions
are updated to minimise further prediction errors. Perception, then, both exte-
roceptive and interoceptive, is the product of (approximate) Bayesian inference,
whereby the influence of prior beliefs and sensory evidence are weighted accord-
ing to “expected precision”, e.g. confidence in the given context, to generate a pos-
terior. Inference in these schemes is thought to occur across a hierarchy of inferred
causes, where higher levels encode regularities that occur at larger spatial and tem-
poral scales (Kiebel, Daunizeau, & Friston, 2008). In perceptual inference, sensory
prediction errors can be minimised by tweaking the parameters of the generative
model – that is, generating predictions to quash the influx of prediction error. Pre-
diction error can also be minimised though action by changing the incoming sen-
sory data to fit a prediction – for instance, I can move my eyes to bring my coffee
cup into view, to fulfil the prediction of a coffee cup. Actions can be thought of as
the fulfilment of proprioceptive (or oculomotor) predictions – an intended move-
ment occurs as a result of predicting the proprioceptive consequences (Friston et
al., 2010; Shadmehr, Smith, & Krakauer, 2010). There are detailed accounts of the
neural implementation of these schemes available (Bastos et al., 2012; Keller &
Mrsic-Flogel, 2018; Shipp, 2016).
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2.2 Precision-weighting
A key feature of predictive processing schemes is the contextual flexibility afforded
by precision-weighting (Clark, 2013; Feldman & Friston, 2010). Precision regulates
the interaction between top-down and bottom-up signals, through the synaptic
gain on neuronal populations signalling prediction error, in order to approximate
optimal inference over time. Precision can be thought of as tracking both the relia-
bility and relevance of the incoming sensory information, where weighting by reli-
ability is analogous to assigning greater weight to more reliable information when
updating a belief. Prediction error signals with high precision (inverse variance)
have greater influence in updating the top-down predictions. Precision itself has
to be inferred, both by the empirical variance in the sensory data itself, and accord-
ing to prior expectations about precision. The optimisation of precision weighting,
through updating of the precision expectations (precision-related priors), is fre-
quently equated to attention within predictive processing (Clark, 2013; Feldman
& Friston, 2010). Importantly for the current treatment, precision is thought to
mediate both sensory attenuation - the top-down filtering out of afferent informa-
tion, and affordances, where affordances refers to the latent possibilities for action
given the capabilities of the agent (Cisek, 2007; Friston, Shiner, et al., 2012).
2.3 Control-oriented inference
In mandating that existence necessitates maintaining oneself within a limited
repertoire of states via control-oriented predictive regulation (instrumental active
inference) (Seth & Tsakiris, 2018), the FEP aligns itself with precursors of this
view, cybernetic theories that build on control, feedback and predictive modelling
(e.g., the “good regulator theorem”) (Conant & Ashby, 1970). Note that while a
purely Helmholtzian view of the brain might cast it in terms of inferring hidden
causes in the world, casting the predictive machinery in terms of being for
ensuring continued existence means that the generative model is not constrained
to veridicality. Rather than faithfully reconstructing the world, perception is
“ultimately geared towards driving actions that preserve [the] physiological
integrity of the organism. In other words, we do not perceive the world (and self)
as it is, but as it is useful to do so” (Seth & Tsakiris, 2018, p. 975).
2.4 Homeostasis
Homeostasis refers to the tendency of living systems to keep an “internal balance”
despite changes in the surrounding environment (Cannon, 1929). This has long
been described in terms of control theoretic and cybernetic mechanisms, and more
recently this homeostatic control is thought to involve interoceptive signals that
report current physiological states (e.g., heart rate, or blood-bound glucose levels)
(Craig, 2002; Damasio & Carvalho, 2013). One way to restore bodily conditions to
favourable states is to engage autonomic reflexes – for example, a hyperthermic
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animal can perspire to cool down. Of course, autonomic regulation alone is not
sufficient to ensure continued existence – to avoid hunger or thirst the animal must
engage actions, such as seeking out food and water. Collectively, these actions
are termed allostasis, the process via which the brain regulates the needs of the
body (Corcoran & Hohwy, 2018; Corcoran, Pezzulo, & Hohwy, 2019; Schulkin &
Sterling, 2019). Crucially, to stay viable on longer timescales, this action must
be anticipatory – avoiding dyshomeostatic conditions before they arise (Pezzulo,
Rigoli, & Friston, 2015; Sterling, 2012).
2.5 Active inference
The FEP regards homeostasis and allostasis as the central aspects of organic life,
thus the autopoietic principles at the basis of the FEP act as a kind of “first prior”
(Allen & Tsakiris, 2018). In other words, “[t]he brain is in the game of predicting
the world, but only as a means to the end of embodied self-preservation” (Allen
& Friston, 2018, p. 12). In so doing, the free energy principle collapses expected
utility (instrumental value) and information gain (epistemic value) under a single
quantity. On this approach, action planning is itself a form of inference, where
preferences and goals are framed in terms of prior beliefs, such that these priors are
fulfilled by action (Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012). Casting value and utility purely
as inferential problems may at first appear unintuitive – if an agent finds itself
in consistently adverse circumstances, then such adverse circumstances should, at
first pass, seem to have high probability. However, “[t]he critical step in this logic
is the assumption that evolution has equipped us with the belief that low utility
states are low probability, due to the fact that if our ancestors spent a lot of time
in those states they would be less likely to reproduce” (Gershman, 2019, p. 7). The
so-called “first prior”, that of maintaining existence via homeostatic and allostatic
regulatory behaviour, ensures that organisms seek to actively maintain internal
and external conditions conducive to their own persistence.
Active inference refers to the process by which agents actively sample states
of the world so as to reduce uncertainty and realise prior preferences, rendering
the action selection process itself an inference problem. This arbitration occurs
according to priors pertaining to expected free energy over a given course of ac-
tion, or policy (Friston et al., 2018; Pezzulo et al., 2015). Expected free energy is
the free energy an agent predicts itself to average in opting to pursue a particular
course of action. Intuitively, some courses of action are more likely than others to
lead to “expected” or desirable outcomes. A policy that has lower expected free en-
ergy is going to have a higher prior probability than a policy with higher expected
free energy, because agents equipped with prior beliefs about their continued ex-
istence will pursue policies that reduce expected free energy (Friston et al., 2015,
2018; Kaplan & Friston, 2018). Crucially, agents engaging in active inference do
not merely restrict themselves to the states they expect; rather they anticipate in
order to minimise uncertainty about potential future outcomes (Friston et al., 2015,
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2018; Pezzulo et al., 2016). This prospective form of control relies on the contextu-
alization provided by higher levels in the inferential hierarchy, which anticipate
the downstream consequences of actions and select policies accordingly (Friston,
2010; Pezzulo et al., 2015). Contextualisation here depends on the relative preci-
sion at various hierarchical levels, where “precision dynamics subsume the role of
arbitration” (Pezzulo et al., 2015, p. 27). This approach bears similarities to other
control-theoretic approaches, such as the affordance competition hypothesis (Cisek,
2007; Pezzulo & Cisek, 2016), where an affordance is a potential for action that
avails itself to an organism in its action-oriented perception of environmental fea-
tures.3 On this view, perceived affordances jostle for precedence and are arbitrated
on the basis of the desirability of their predicted outcomes.
3 The self in active inference
This section outlines an account of how pre-reflective self-consciousness – an im-
plicit sense of being a subject present in all experience – is structured within an
active inference framework. Here, the self-model is underpinned by the same in-
ferential Bayesian schemes that are increasingly being used to describe perception
and action. This predictive-modelling approach to selfhood has roots in Thomas
Metzinger’s work on conscious and unconscious self-models, and the “self-model
theory of subjectivity” (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Metzinger, 2003, 2009) where
“[a] self-model, an inner image of the organism as a whole [is] built into the world-
model, and this is how the consciously experienced first-person perspective de-
velop[s]” (Metzinger, 2009, p. 64).
The account presented here follows the increasing focus on the embodied na-
ture of selfhood, where “being” or “having” a body is thought to be one of the
most basic aspects of the experience of being a self (Allen & Friston, 2018; Apps
& Tsakiris, 2014; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013).
A growing number of researchers seek to ground selfhood and emotion in intero-
ceptive processes, particularly in their functional relation to allostatic regulation
(Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Seth, 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016). A key reason for this is
that interoceptive inference is apt to put greater emphasis on control over discovery
(Seth & Friston, 2016), due to “a priori hyper-precision of visceral channels”(Allen
& Friston, 2018, p. 7), in which interoceptive signals are assigned very high pre-
cision in virtue of communicating information about key physiological variables
(Seth, 2015). Grounding the self-model in control-oriented active inference (Seth &
Tsakiris, 2018) inflects perception of the affordance landscape in terms of bodily
states, an idea which is nicely expressed by Montague and King-Casas:
3It is worth noting here that the proposal put forward in this paper is considered to be compatible
with both internalist and externalist conceptions of the mind. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer
for suggesting this clarification.
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A sated and comfortable lioness looking at two antelopes sees two un-
threatening creatures against the normal backdrop of the temperate
savanna. The same lioness, when hungry, sees only one thing – the
most immediate prey. In another circumstance, in which the lioness
may be inordinately hot, the distant, shaded tree becomes the promi-
nent visual object in the field of view.
(Montague & King-Casas, 2007, p. 519)
This forms the basis for the view that will be unpacked in more detail in what fol-
lows, that the self-model can be understood as an “allostatic control model”, arising
from the system’s sense of control of the temporally deep consequences of actions
for allostasis. On this view, pre-reflective self-consciousness is underpinned by
the inference about endogenous control of the sensory consequences of actions
within deep goal hierarchies, where goals and preferences are framed in terms of
prior beliefs, such that goals are fulfilled by actions (Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012;
Pezzulo et al., 2015). Recall, action allows an organism to change the sensory in-
put in order to conform to its generative model, as opposed to perceptual inference
that involves revising model parameters to conform to the sensory input. In order
to act, then, the system implicitly infers its own ability to bring about the intended
sensory consequences – it is in this sense that “implicit in a model of sampling is a
representation or sense of agency” (Friston, 2012a, p. 173), which is closely related
to what has been called the “primacy of the ‘I can’ ” (Bruineberg, 2017). Crucially,
organisms with deep temporal models have “temporal thickness” – expectations
regarding the sensory consequences of actions on multiple interlocking timescales.
The following sections will unpack this conception of the self-model in terms of
hierarchically deep allostatic control, starting with the notion of temporal thick-
ness, and then moving to howmotivated control hierarchies “attune” organisms to
action opportunities on multiple timescales, for both proximal goals, for instance,
pain motivating an organism to act so as to fulfil a “healthy body condition” prior;
and distal goals, for example emotions motivating a change of circumstances per-
taining to longer timescales such as moving to a different city. The discussion will
then move to how deep self-models allow organisms to arbitrate between different
policies and trade off outcomes on different timescales.
3.1 Temporal thickness
To successfully navigate the world over longer timescales, and select policies that
result in survival – and not dispersion or non-existence – organisms must possess
models of the future; in other words, they require deep temporal models (Friston
et al., 2018). The generative models that endow organisms with the capability of
inferring the consequences of future actions must have the property of temporal
thickness, which allows the organism to anticipate the downstream consequences
of potential actions, conferring the ability to select policies or action scripts that
are favourable to the organism’s continued existence (Friston, 2018). The minimi-
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sation of surprise through active inference on the FEP involves acting so as to
reduce uncertainty, and to do this the system must model itself across time and
counterfactuals – that is, it must model what kind of agent it is at varying de-
grees of temporal depth. Self-modelling, then, emerges as a natural consequence
of prospective action selection (Friston, 2018), where the principal function of a
counterfactually rich self-model is to facilitate navigation of the affordance land-
scape and action selection across multiple interlocking timescales – for example
expectations of what an agent can do on shorter timescales inform expectations
of what the agent can do over longer timescales. The functional role of having a
rich self-model, then, is that it enables the organism to predict outcomes across
diverse policies, and endows the organism with “what if?” capabilities (Friston,
2018), which puts this picture into contact with mental time travel and offline sim-
ulation (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008).
3.2 Attuning to the world
Conceiving of the self-model through an active inference framework, a hierarchi-
cally deep self-model guides policy selection over various timescales in service
of minimising expected free energy. In what follows, pain perception, viewed as
arising through the violation of the prior of “healthy body condition” (Ongaro &
Kaptchuk, 2019), will be used to illustrate how inferences about the self “attune”
an organism to adaptive action opportunities.
One key advantage that the active inference account of self-modelling has over
strictly Bayesian approaches is that it is goal-directed (Moutoussis et al., 2014).
Classical models of pain perception as the consequence of physiological dysfunc-
tion are challenged by the efficacy of placebo treatments in relieving pain (Anchisi
& Zanon, 2015), and cases in which pain is experienced without physiological dis-
ruption, as is often the case in chronic pain. Instead, there is evidence to suggest
that affectively charged percepts, such as pain, are best understood as resting on
the same inferential mechanisms as are assumed to underpin perception and ac-
tion under a predictive processing framework (Büchel, Geuter, Sprenger, & Eippert,
2014). Bayesian models of pain perception (Morton, El-Deredy, Watson, & Jones,
2010) indicate that prior beliefs about the generation of painful percepts are inte-
grated with current sensory data to infer the posterior or hidden worldly cause
(the painful percept). Crucially, these pain percepts incorporate the “weight” or
precision of past experiences when computing the current painful percept (Mor-
ton et al., 2010). On their own, however, these models of pain perception are silent
on the functional role of pain as a motivator to an embodied organism (Moutoussis
et al., 2014). Optimal inference about pain to the allostatically concerned organism
is heavily dependent on the context, as anyone who has felt the pain of an injury
only after danger is averted can attest to. In this way, pain perception is allostat-
ically “tuned”: “organisms can tune their own pain perception according to both
their prior beliefs and the specific biological goals they believe are attainable in
that context” (Moutoussis et al., 2014, p. 70).
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A Bayesian framework of pain perception, therefore, needs to represent the
agency and aims of the organism. This is precisely what is afforded by conceiving
of the self-model within an active inference framework (Friston, 2012b) – as this
provides the necessary context to study the self-model, across multiple hierarchi-
cal levels. Like physical pain, and sharing the neural underpinnings of physical
pain (Eisenberger, 2012), social pain is similarly understood in inferential terms,
and does not scale with “damage” per se (for instance, social rejection), as evi-
denced by the wide range of sensitivity people have to the same physical manip-
ulation (Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman, & Naliboff, 2006). Accordingly, there is
evidence to suggest that appropriately “tuning” emotional responses in social con-
texts allows for agents to approximate Bayesian inference in policy selection given
bounded cognitive capacity and rationality. For example, on a “stag hunt” game,4
agents with “prosocial” preferences can outperform agents of similar cognitive so-
phistication that lack social biases (Yoshida, Dolan, & Friston, 2008).
3.3 Emotion
Conceptualising emotions in terms of a contextualisation of bodily states has his-
torical roots dating back to the James-Lange theory of emotion (Cannon, 1927) and
two-factor theory of emotion (Schachter & Singer, 1963). Lisa Feldman-Barrett
has developed this approach specifically within the active inference framework as
the “theory of constructed emotion” (Barrett, 2017). According to the theory of
constructed emotion, emotions are constructed in the same manner as percepts,
where priors are recruited according to context to make a “best guess” at the hid-
den causes of (interoceptive) sensory signals. On Barrett’s view, emotions arise
through a context-sensitive inferential categorisation of interoceptive states. For
this reason, emotions on this view are “constructions” – there are no neural or
physiological signatures that reliably discriminate any emotional state (Siegel et
al., 2018; Wager et al., 2015). Rather, physiological reactions in the body occur in
order to prepare it for action, and these are categorised as emotions only contextu-
ally through the predictive models recruited to explain away the incoming afferent
interoceptive signals. For example, heart rate increases or decreases depending
only on an anticipated action – e.g., fight or flight – and given an emotional as-
cription only contextually – e.g., the same bodily state could be categorised as
fear in one context and anger in another. Interoceptive inference is experienced
as emotion in service of producing allostatic action (Barrett, Quigley, & Hamil-
ton, 2016; Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Wilkinson, Deane, Nave, & Clark, 2019). In
viewing the self-model in terms of hierarchical allostatic control, interoceptive in-
ference on the hidden causes of bodily states pertaining to longer timescales tunes
perception to the world and affordances differently, such that more abstract emo-
4A stag hunt game is a cooperative hunting game, where in order to hunt a stag (higher-payoff), an
agent must have the cooperation of a partner. An agent can catch a rabbit (lower-payoff) without
cooperating.
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tions might track regularities over longer time scales, informing policy selection
thereon (Pezzulo, 2014), and allowing for more abstract and distal outcomes to be
motivationally salient.
3.4 Hierarchically deep self-models
Viewing the self-model in terms of allostatic control renders selfhood fundamen-
tally affective and action-oriented, such that different aspects of the self in a given
context – precision on goals and preferences at different levels of the hierarchy –
motivate behaviour and arbitrate between policies. On this view, the self-model
inflects perception of possible actions in the world and mediates salience to facil-
itate the selection of policies with minimal expected free energy. Critical to this
picture is the notion that these various models are associated with varying de-
grees of temporal depth (Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Friston, 2018). Deep generative models
capture increasingly distal relations between actions and outcomes within hierar-
chical active inference, allowing for the coordination of behaviour across different
hierarchical levels, enabling goals to become prioritised relative to current con-
text (Pezzulo et al., 2018). The result is an inferential framework of hierarchically
nested contextual complexity, in which lower levels track basic (and sometimes
evolutionarily hard-wired) motivations or affordances, while higher levels track
motivations and plans over deeper timescales. In this way, higher-level contextu-
alization of lower sensorimotor functions optimises expected actions in terms of
both long-range consequences of actions and anticipated future affordances. Goals
at different levels of abstraction may, of course, conflict – for instance, resolving
proximal interoceptive prediction error by eating chocolate cake might conflict
with the longer-term goal of sticking to a diet (Pezzulo et al., 2018). Alternatively,
temporary deviation from homeostatic set points at lower levels may be elicited to
maintain higher level set points – such as a temporary change in blood pressure
and adrenaline levels to engage fight-flight behaviour, with the goal of reaching
safety and maintaining physiological integrity on a longer timescale. On the view
of self-modelling in terms of allostatic control described, dimensions of the self
at higher-levels constrain the self at lower-levels in that the self-model “actively
shapes itself over time to align with those higher level regularities” (Hohwy &
Michael, 2017, p. 370), for example long-term goals can be decomposed into inter-
mediate short term-goals.
This section has explored how the self-model arises as a consequence of a sys-
tem engaged in temporally deep active inference, as prior probabilities over partic-
ular policies depend on knowledge about what and where the system finds itself,
and what actions are available to it (Friston et al., 2013; Moutoussis et al., 2014).
Through active inference, agents can use their self-model to inform their goal and
policy selection in order to arrive at high probability outcomes. This could entail
assigning low probability to the self occupying states that are aversive, either phys-
ically or socially – with different hierarchical levels of the self-model contributing
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to different goal states. In this way, the hierarchical self-model determines salience
– where “salience is literally defined by whatever has the most (or least) impact on
visceral and autonomic homeostasis” (Allen & Tsakiris, 2018, p. 7), at increasingly
deep spatiotemporal scales and levels of abstraction.
4 Psychedelics
One of the most striking and philosophically interesting effects of psychedelics
is the radical disruptions of self-consciousness they can occasion (Huxley, 2010;
Leary, Metzner, & Alpert, 1964), including apparently “selfless states” (Lebedev et
al., 2015; Nour, Evans, Nutt, & Carhart-Harris, 2016). These states, instances of
“Drug-Induced Ego-Dissolution” (DIED) are characterised by an experienced loss
of self and/or loss of self/world boundary (Millière, 2017; Millière, Carhart-Harris,
Roseman, Trautwein, & Berkovich-Ohana, 2018). DIED occurs most reliably un-
der high doses of “classical” psychedelic drugs (5-HT2A receptor agonists), such
as dimethyltryptamine (DMT), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and psilocybin.
Ego-dissolution appears to be induced more reliably under psychedelics than med-
itation, in a dose-dependent manner, and prompted most reliably by high-doses
(Nour et al., 2016). Recent theoretical work has explored the phenomenological
and neurophysiological similarities and differences of ego-dissolution induced by
drugs and meditation (Millière et al., 2018; see also Limanowski & Friston, 2020,
Millière, 2020, Sebastián, 2020, all in this special issue).
4.1 Psychedelic therapy
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the therapeutic potential of
psychedelics. Several studies have found preliminary evidence that with adminis-
tration in controlled circumstances psychedelics can be both safe and therapeutic,
with an emphasis on the importance of context in achieving therapeutic outcomes
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2018). Interestingly, the positive therapeutic effects seem to
scale with “peak” or mystical experience in the psychedelic state (Roseman, Nutt,
& Carhart-Harris, 2018). Psychedelics have been shown to be effective in treating
depression (Lyons & Carhart-Harris, 2018; Palhano-Fontes et al., 2019), obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Moreno, Wiegand, Taitano, & Delgado, 2006), end of life ex-
istential distress (Griffiths et al., 2016), and have even been proposed as a potential
treatment for disorders of consciousness such as the vegetative state and the min-
imally conscious state (Scott & Carhart-Harris, 2019). Carhart-Harris interprets
the therapeutic effects as a result of “relaxing” high-level beliefs, allowing for a
revision of pathological beliefs that have become overly dominant and resistant to
revision, coined the “TIghtened BEliefs in Response to uncertainty” (TIBER) model
(Carhart-Harris, 2019). The basic tenet is that under conditions of uncertainty the
model falls back on “tightened” belief structures as a defencemechanism against in-
tolerable stress and uncertainty. This fits withwhat wemight expect under the FEP,
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as adopting shallow policies (such as addictive behaviours) may appear adaptive in
the short term, rather than risking policieswith greater expected free energy due to
low precision or uncertainty. It has recently been proposed that psychedelics “re-
lax” high-level priors in the generativemodel, allowing for the (context-dependent)
revision of pathological high-level beliefs (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019). Both
psychological insight and peak-experience in the psychedelic state appear to be
predictors of long-term positive prognoses (Roseman et al., 2018).
4.2 Psychedelics in the predictive brain
The REBUS – “RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics” – model of psychedelic
function, offers a preliminary but promising model of psychedelic action where
psychedelics, through 5-HT2A agonism, “relax” high-level priors or beliefs
(Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019). Here, the focus will be on how this mechanism
may be cast under the hierarchical predictive processing framework as modulat-
ing precision-weighting. To bring this into focus, this section will review how
precision-weighting sets a variable Bayesian learning rate in order to highlight
certain features relevant to understanding the effects of psychedelics within
this framework. Christoph Mathys and colleagues have recently developed a
mathematical tool for modelling Bayesian inference modulated by expectations of
volatility known as the hierarchical Gaussian filter (Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston,
& Stephan, 2011; Mathys et al., 2014). The hierarchical Gaussian filter Mathys
posits allows a system to optimally balance the influence of prediction errors in
changing environments – in other words, to adjust its learning rate.
4.3 Bayesian learning rate
To recap, the predictive processing framework asserts that the brain instantiates
“generative models” of the causes of incoming sensory data, iteratively updating
these predictive models in light of incoming “prediction error” (Clark, 2013). This
predictive inference is thought to occur across a hierarchy of inferred causes,
where high levels track causes and regularities operating over deeper spatial
and temporal scales, and lower levels track regularities over shallower spatial
and temporal scales (Kiebel et al., 2008). The picture of the living or cognitive
system as one which needs to optimise its own learning rate emerges out of
the operationalization of Bayesian inference in predictive processing, namely in
terms of predictions and precision-weighted prediction errors (Mathys et al., 2014).
According to predictive processing the prediction is given by the prior probability
(which itself comes from the previous posterior) and the prediction error is given
by the difference between the prediction and the incoming sensory evidence.
Prediction error is weighted according to the relative precisions of the prior and
the prediction error (where precision is equivalent to the inverse variance of each
probability distribution). Intuitively, highly precise prediction error will drag
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the posterior closer to the distribution of the sensory evidence and further from
the prior, and in cases of low precision weighting of the prediction error, the
inference relies more on the prior. This determines the learning rate:
The more certain we are that the prior hypothesis is correct, the less
we should be influenced by the prediction error (the evidence), which
means that the learning rate is low. Conversely, the better the preci-
sion on the prediction error, the higher the learning rate; that is, the
more we trust the quality of the evidence the more we should learn
from it (Hohwy, 2017, p. 76)
In other words, the lower the learning rate, the greater the influence of top-down
modulation from priors; the higher the learning rate, the greater the influence of
the sensory evidence on the resulting posterior. Here, precision-weighting is the
key mechanism – heavily weighted prediction errors drive a higher learning rate.
In order to approximate Bayesian inference over time, it is essential for sensory
systems to balance the learning rate appropriately. Over-reliance on priors means
the system will fail to learn from experience, whereas over-reliance on sensory
evidence (which may be noisy) will lead the system to “overfit”. On this picture,
Bayesian perceptual inference that minimises prediction error on the appropriate
timescale – that is, not overfitting or underfitting the model – needs to have a
means of regulating the learning rate (Mathys et al., 2014). This is implemented by
building models of precision, or expected uncertainty, where higher-level priors
track longer-term regularities that inform the relative precisions of more basic
priors (Hohwy, 2017). Optimising the learning rate, and in-so-doing minimising
prediction error over time, is a critical challenge the brain faces. This is equivalent
to selecting a time frame over which to minimise prediction error. Minimising
prediction error over too short a timescale – overfitting – runs the risk of increasing
prediction error in the long run. Conversely, failing to accommodate new evidence
will lead to underfitting, a failure to update predictions in light of new sensory
evidence.
4.4 Psychedelic action as high Bayesian learning rate
In line with the REBUS model (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019), the relaxing of
high-level priors under classical (serotonergic) psychedelics5 means the system
adopts a very high Bayesian learning rate – that is, it is in a highly plastic state, in
accordance with research showing an increase in plasticity under psychedelics (Ly
et al., 2018). This picture casts the perceptual effects of psychedelics – “tripping” –
as rampant overfitting of the sensory data, resulting from a loss of the usual con-
5This account is not thought to generalise to dissociative anaesthetics, like ketamine or phencycli-
dine (PCP), which are thought to have quite different mechanisms of action, acting primarily at
NMDA glutamate receptors. Comparative approaches of both the mechanisms of action of other
drugs as compared to psychedelics, and the mechanisms underpinning different experiences of
ego-dissolution, would be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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straint exerted by higher-levels on lower-levels of the inferential hierarchy. This
“rampant overfitting”, resulting from diminished influence from contextualising
high-level priors tracking regularities on longer timescales, means the model fits a
very short temporal scale, rapidly cycling through candidate models to account for
the incoming sensory signal. It is worth highlighting a compatibility of the high
Bayesian learning rate approach with other accounts of the mechanism of action
of psychedelics in the predictive brain. The REBUS model posits the mechanism
of action of psychedelics as reduced precision at high levels rather than increased
precision at the sensory peripheries, as psychedelics appear to disrupt functioning
via stimulation of 5-HT2A receptors on deep pyramidal neurons, thought to encode
high level priors or beliefs (Beliveau et al., 2017; Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019;
Jakab & Goldman-Rakic, 1998). In contrast, Philip Corlett and colleagues have
suggested that psychedelics preserve normal priors and act by increasing sensory
noise through enhanced AMPA signalling (Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009; Corlett,
Honey, & Fletcher, 2016). On this approach, if the relaxation of high-level priors
is indeed an effect of psychedelics, it could be understood to be the result of the
fact that “the persistence and strength of the sensory signal suggest that there is
something to be explained” (Corlett et al., 2009, p. 521). Arbitrating between these
two mechanistic accounts and disentangling causation – whether the relaxation of
high-level priors causes the reduction in sensory gating, or reduction in sensory
gating eventually lowers precision at high levels – becomes very difficult here, and
it is not clear a simplistic causal account is the right approach. While identifying
the mechanisms of action is a key empirical and theoretical project, one potential
advantage of the high Bayesian learning rate hypothesis is that it doesn’t distin-
guish between high precision at low levels and low precision at high levels, and as
such remains agnostic over the mechanism of action while preserving the useful
theoretical features of both accounts that will inform the theoretical account of
ego-dissolution that follows.
4.5 Evidence for the high Bayesian learning rate hypothesis
A high Bayesian learning rate is concordant with the enhanced neural plasticity
observed in individuals in a psychedelic state (Barre et al., 2016; Berthoux, Barre,
Bockaert, Marin, & Bécamel, 2018; Ly et al., 2018). While an impairment to high-
level cognition is found under psychedelics (Bayne & Carter, 2018), in line with the
high Bayesian learning rate hypothesis, low-level learning (including extinction
learning) and processing appears to be unaffected or enhanced in the psychedelic
state (Carhart-Harris & Nutt, 2017; King, Martin, & Seymour, 1972; Romano et
al., 2010). Further evidence for a high Bayesian learning rate under psychedelics
is provided by a study looking at the effect of psilocybin on Kanisza triangles –
perceptual objects where the brain “fills in” illusory contours using prior expec-
tations – which found reduced filling in and a reduction in the related evoked
potentials (Kometer, Cahn, Andel, Carter, & Vollenweider, 2011), concordant with
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the fact that a high Bayesian learning rate will reduce the effect of sensory history
on current perception. In binocular rivalry studies – where different images are
presented to each eye simultaneously, and are typically experienced as switching
from one percept to the other – reduced switch rates and increased likelihood of
the percept being a fusion of the two images has been observed under psilocybin
(Carter et al., 2007, 2005), suggestive of less influence of priors on constraining cur-
rent perception. Oddball paradigms are also suggestive of a weakened influence
of priors on perception under psychedelics. In a sequence of tones, an “oddball”
tone (unexpected given prior experience and context) generates a “mismatch neg-
ativity”, an evoked brain response which has been interpreted in predictive coding
terms as prediction error violating the expectations of the sequence (Garrido, Kil-
ner, Stephan, & Friston, 2009). Under LSD, the surprise response to oddball stimuli
is blunted, suggestive of a weakened influence of prior expectations (Timmermann
et al., 2018).
Arguably, there is also phenomenological evidence for the high Bayesian learn-
ing rate hypothesis. Perhaps most eloquently articulated by Aldous Huxley: “Vi-
sual impressions are greatly intensified and the eye recovers some of the perceptual
innocence of childhood, when the sensum was not immediately and automatically
subordinated to the concept” (Huxley, 2010, p. 12).
This observation lends itself to a straightforward translation into the terms of
predictive processing, where “subordinated to the concept” can be understood as
“constrained by higher-level priors”. More generally, psychedelic phenomenology
such as dynamic distortions of spatial dimensions, where things change dramati-
cally in size and shape can be understood as a failure of high-level priors to canalise
and constrain lower level predictions.
5 Psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution in active
inference
Given this picture of the action of psychedelics within a predictive processing
framework, and the characterisation of self-models in terms of allostatic control,
how should states of psychedelic-induced ego dissolution be conceptualised? The
proposal here is that a loss of precision on high-level priors results in a flattening of
temporal depth of the affordance landscape for the organism – precisely because
it is high-level priors tracking longer timescales that structure temporally deep
generative models. Recall, under active inference, lower and higher hierarchical
levels encode regularities that unfold at faster and slower timescales respectively
(Kiebel et al., 2008), such as the expected consequences of action both for proximal
and distal goals (Pezzulo et al., 2015, 2018). Adopting a high Bayesian learning rate
is equivalent to changing the time frame over which prediction error is minimised
to fit very short timescales. As a result, the deep temporal models that typically
guide action and policy selection collapse, and the faster timescales correspond-
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ing to lower levels are modelled in a much finer degree of detail (Pink-Hashkes,
Rooij, & Kwisthout, 2017). On the account presented in this paper, the self-model
is constructed and bolstered in relation to affordances in the environment on sev-
eral interlocked timescales, where high-levels contextualise and canalise the levels
below and allow for motivational orientation to action opportunities pertaining
to distal outcomes. Under psychedelics, the relaxation of high-level priors and
the corresponding high Bayesian learning rate results in a collapse in the tempo-
ral thickness of deep generative models, and a collapse in the temporal depth of
the corresponding self-model, which is understood as being is bolstered according
to counterfactually rich expectations of the consequences of action on multiple
timescales.
The collapse in temporal thickness can be understood as occurring due to a fail-
ure of sensory attenuation, occurring due to low precision at high-levels and a cor-
respondingly high Bayesian learning rate. Similar stories about aberrant precision
at high-levels of the hierarchy corresponding to inferences about affordances and
agency have been proposed to underpin hallucinations and delusions in psychosis
(Adams, Stephan, Brown, Frith, & Friston, 2013; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Sterzer
et al., 2018). Distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous causes – that
is, distinguishing between perceptual inputs caused by oneself and those caused
by the world – is vital for an agent to be able to effectively move through action
space. Corollary discharges – predictions about the sensory consequences of ac-
tions – allow the system to do this by withdrawing precision from self-generated
movements, and are thought to underpin experienced agency of actions (Crapse
& Sommer, 2008; Friston, 2012b). The failure to predict the consequences of move-
ment due to a failure of sensory attenuation is thought to result in an inability
to attribute agency (Adams et al., 2013; Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, & Fris-
ton, 2013); for instance, a failure of corollary discharge has been thought to cause
the attribution of inner speech to an external source in voice-hearing (Ford, Gray,
Faustman, Roach, & Mathalon, 2007; Ford & Mathalon, 2005; Heinks-Maldonado
et al., 2007). Importantly, for present purposes, corollary discharge can be un-
derstood as a kind of prior (Friston, 2010), and low-precision priors have been
associated with the severity in psychotic symptoms and disturbances of agency in
people with schizophrenia (Rösler et al., 2015). A reduction of precision on high-
level priors in the psychedelic state means that the corollary discharges that would
usually cancel out the expected consequences of actions fail to do so, generating
an increase in prediction error at lower levels. These unexpected consequences
are then attributed to external rather than internal causes, as the more prediction
error is generated, the more likely an action (or thought) has exogenous rather
than endogenous causes (Frith, 2003). This echoes similar themes in the autism
literature. In autism, the failure of sensory attenuation “leads to the hypervigilant
attention to sensory detail at the expense of a hierarchically deep explanation for
sensations” (Picard & Friston, 2014, p. 1116) leading to what has been termed a
“loss of central coherence” (Frith, 2003). Attribution to exogenous rather than en-
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dogenous causes could result in a loss of “perceptual mineness” – the background
feeling that my experiences are “mine” – if, as has been argued, perceptual mine-
ness is underpinned by anticipation of changes in perceptual inputs in relation to
movements (Hohwy, 2007).6
Ego-dissolution is not, however, confined to a loss of agentive control over
immediate action outcomes, but may be characterised by a more profound dis-
solution of the sense of being a self or “I” distinct from the outside world. On
the view presented in this paper, pre-reflective self-consciousness arises not just
through modelling control over the most immediate sensory consequences of ac-
tions, but is bolstered by inferences about endogenous control over the distal sen-
sory consequences of allostatic action and action policies. Under a high dose of
a psychedelic, the temporary suspension on the gating mechanism on incoming
sensory data, described in this paper in terms of a high Bayesian learning rate,
render both the proximal and distal sensory consequences of actions highly unpre-
dictable, and the system ceases to have the sense of their being an agent which can
(and should) be controlling sensory outcomes. Several authors have emphasised
the psychedelic experience is a dynamic process as opposed to a firmly designated
state (Masters & Houston, 1966; Preller & Vollenweider, 2016), and different types
of ego-dissolution might occur both over the course of the experience and at dif-
ferent dosages. For example, inferences on the boundaries of the body (Blanke &
Metzinger, 2009) might be increasingly blurred due to a failure to attenuate the
flurry of low-level prediction error. Aspects of the self-model corresponding to
longer timescales may break down due to a sustained failure of high levels to at-
tenuate prediction error from low levels due to highly volatile prediction errors,
consistent with the fact that bodily ego-dissolution tends to precede dissolution
of narrative self (Savage, 1955). This fact is also perhaps suggestive, in opposition
to the high-levels posited by the REBUS model, that ego-dissolution could be seen
as the result of the high-levels failing to contextualise the upsurge of prediction
error from across the cortex. The fact that the highest level of the self-model are
“increasingly abstract, complex and invariant” (Limanowski & Friston, 2018, p. 5),
may explain why higher levels of the self-model are going to be less perturbed
by prediction error and perhaps only reliably altered at high dosages. Empirical
exploration of these possibilities might be a fruitful avenue for future work, in
particular through bridging the neurocomputational mechanisms posited here to
both the dynamics of the experience as uncovered through “microphenomenolog-
ical” interviews (Millière, 2017; Petitmengin, 2006), and to the underlying neural
correlates of the experience (Timmermann et al., 2019).
The account of ego-dissolution in terms of a collapse in the temporal thickness
6It is worth noting that while some comparisons can be drawn between the psychedelic state and
predictive processing accounts of psychosis (Sterzer et al., 2018) and autism (Palmer, Lawson, &
Hohwy, 2017), a key difference here is that in the psychedelic state the system typically begins
“from a baseline of stable high-level priors (e.g., a stable ego) to which it returns as drug effects
subside” (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019, p. 328).
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of the affordance landscape presented here should also apply to the concept of a
“cognitive affordance” landscape, where the “central function of autonomous ac-
tivity in the mind wandering network is to create a constant stream of affordances
for cognitive agency, a continuing internal competition among possible cognitive
actions” (Metzinger, 2017, p. 2). Metzinger argues that mental actions – such as
the volitional control of endogenous attention, or retrieval of an episodic memory
– have epistemic rather that pragmatic goal states. On the allostatic control model
of selfhood, the self-model would be constructed and bolstered relative not only
to the expectations of the control of the sensory consequences of actions, but also
the consequences of mental actions, where the consequences of a mental action
might be epistemic and also interoceptive (consider a case where a memory trig-
gers an autonomic response which subsequently acts as the afferent input to an
interoceptive inference underpinning a felt emotion). Under psychedelics, loss of
control of the expected outcomes of mental actions (as well as a loss of the prag-
matic concerns usually driving which epistemic actions to take) might then also be
fundamental to the experience of ego-dissolution. This idea is consistent with the
fact that under psychedelics mental phenomena “take on the character of objective
reality” (Savage, 1955, p. 12), where the ownership of mental phenomena seems to
subside and “the individual may feel like a bystander watching the mental activity
of another person” (Girn & Christoff, 2018, p. 145).
It is worth mentioning a potential implication of this view for consciousness
science more broadly. The psychedelic experience and ego-dissolution are often
described as an “expansion” of consciousness. Friston (2018) argues that not only
self-consciousness, but consciousness itself, is underpinned by temporal thickness:
“consciousness is nothing more than inference about my future; namely, the self-
evidencing consequences of what I could do” (Friston, 2018, p. 1). States of ego-
dissolution, understood as collapse in the temporal thickness of the generative
model, suggest that while temporal thickness very much structures our normal
waking experience, it is not clear that temporal thickness ought to be equated
with consciousness per se (see also Metzinger, 2020, this issue; Sebastián, 2020,
this issue).
5.1 Ecstatic ego-dissolution and challenging experiences
The question remains as to why the hypothesised collapse in the temporal thick-
ness of the self-model under psychedelics can be both ecstatic and of enduring
therapeutic value. To bring this into focus, it’s worth recapitulating core features
of the self-model provided earlier. Recall, interoceptive inference on states of the
embodied self “attunes” organisms to their affordance landscape, where inferences
about the state of the embodied self (e.g. hunger) prescribe certain prediction er-
ror minimising policies (e.g. finding food). Inferences pertaining to allostatic con-
sequences on longer timescales may mean higher-level imperatives trump lower-
level drives, such as choosing to abstain from chocolate cake to stay healthy (Pez-
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zulo et al., 2018). In the case of basic bodily needs, as described, these variables are
controlled (Seth, 2015) through action – active inference is deployed to bring the
world into line with predictions, rather than adjusting predictions (via perceptual
inference) to conform to the world – for instance eating when hungry (Pezzulo
et al., 2015). In just the same way that a hungry organism can act so as to har-
vest confirmatory evidence for the hypothesis “I am sated”, hypotheses relating
to higher-levels of the self-model geared towards control of outcomes on longer
timescales act to constrain action in the present to bring downstream outcomes
closer in line with the prior expectation. Overly precise priors driving action on a
long timescale which are failing to be fulfilled, on this view, would be a persistent
cause of suffering, due to the system consistently failing to meet (or align actions
towards) the goal state (Hesp, Smith, Allen, Friston, & Ramstead, 2019). Under the
model of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution proposed, the high-precision high-
level priors geared towards control on multiple timescales cease to exert influence
on the system due to the proposed lowering of precision of high-level priors un-
der psychedelics. If action ordinarily arises from a process of minimising devia-
tions between the organism’s actual (inferred) and desired trajectory (Friston et
al., 2010), the loss of precision on high-level priors means that, instead of driving
action policies, they lose influence on the rest of the system and cease to struc-
ture pre-reflective self-consciousness to orient to action opportunities favouring
their fulfilment. As these prior beliefs are relaxed, they instead become amenable
to perceptual revision from the influx of (highly precise) interoceptive and exte-
roceptive information. The collapse in temporal depth in the psychedelic state is
therefore not experienced as a loss of allostatic control, precisely for the reason
that the priors pertaining to longer timescales are no longer asserting an influence
on the system and constraining action (and perception) in their usual manner. This
picture seems to align well with phenomenological reports of ego-dissolution: “It
felt as if ‘I’ did no longer exist. There was purely my sensory perception of my en-
vironment, but sensory input was not translated into needs, feelings, or acting by
‘me’ ” (unpublished online survey data quoted in Millière et al., 2018, p. 7). Peak
experiences under psychedelics, then, could be understood as absence of predic-
tion errors relating to allostasis due to a flattening of the temporal depth of the
affordance landscape, resulting in the feeling of “oceanic boundlessness” – a sense
of immense well-being and peace. Here, the “itinerant strategies” to stay within
our “species-specific window of viability” (Clark, 2013, p. 13), are no longer nec-
essary as the “first prior” – the expectation or imperative for existence – is being
met without conditions.
Following the TIBER model, many psychopathologies may be due to high
precision on high-level priors (Carhart-Harris, 2019; Clark, Watson, & Friston,
2018). Peak psychedelic experience may act as a “reset” allowing for revision of
entrenched high-level beliefs that structure pre-reflective self-consciousness (and,
accordingly, the affordance landscape) – opening up new domains of salience
and possibility for meaningful engagement with the world, through revised and
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retuned self-models. Increased bottom-up information flow (particularly from
the limbic system), through a high Bayesian learning rate, may make entrenched
high-level priors amenable to revision via perceptual inference rather than
driving control via active inference. This lays the theoretical groundwork for why
psychedelics may effectively treat depression: if depression is underpinned by a
high precision prior of low allostatic self-efficacy (Stephan et al., 2016), it follows
that relaxation and revision of this prior should alleviate depressive symptoms.
Finally, (and speculatively), if the account of “retuning” of self-models under
psychedelics presented here generalises to the bodily self (which the experiential
changes in bodily selfhood would suggest) this account is suggestive of a potential
role for psychedelics in the treatment of chronic pain, and for phantom limb pain
– for which there has already been promising results (Fanciullacci, Bene, Franchi,
& Sicuteri, 1977; Ramachandran, Chunharas, Marcus, Furnish, & Lin, 2018).
The primary focus so far has been on “peak” experiences, due to the growing
number of papers indicating they are central to positive long-term therapeutic out-
comes (Roseman et al., 2018). However, while generally psychedelics are thought
to be very low risk (Nutt, King, & Phillips, 2010), and there is evidence to sug-
gest they are protective against mental health problems (Hendricks, Thorne, Clark,
Coombs, & Johnson, 2015), acute and occasionally persistent adverse psychological
reactions do sometimes occur (Strassman, 1984). While “complete” ego-dissolution
is described as a “state of complete surrender, associated bliss, and union with all
things” (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019, p. 321), “incomplete” ego-dissolution –
due to psychological resistance or an insufficient dose – can be characterised by
intense fear, anxiety, or distress. On the account presented in this paper, this can
be understood as resulting from psychological resistance, where psychological re-
sistance here may be conceptualised as a high-precision prior on being able to con-
trol the experience, that is maintained though fear-driven endogenous attention.
Failure to control the experience, in violating the highly precise prior for the goal
state of control, is then experienced as a loss of allostatic control, bringing with it
feelings of intense fear or distress. In therapeutic contexts, encouraging users to
“let go” and “surrender” to the experience (Richards, 2015), could be understood
in these terms, as discouraging the user from putting high (endogenous) precision
on a prior for control that could result in adverse experiences when unfulfilled.
These considerations highlight the essential importance of context in achieving
therapeutic outcomes (Carhart-Harris et al., 2018).
6 Conclusion
Psychedelics are known for their ability to profoundly alter consciousness
and occasion so-called “mystical” experiences (Huxley, 2010). The renaissance
in psychedelic research in the past decade is beginning to shed light on the
mechanisms underpinning the extraordinary states of consciousness induced
by psychedelics (Carhart-Harris & Goodwin, 2017). Within psychedelic phe-
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nomenology, experiences of ego-dissolution are of particular phenomenological,
philosophical and therapeutic interest (Letheby & Gerrans, 2017; Millière, 2017;
Nour & Carhart-Harris, 2017). This paper has given a preliminary account of
how ego-dissolution under psychedelics can be understood in terms of predictive
processing and active inference. The hypothesis here is that the action of
psychedelics within the predictive processing framework is best understood
as a “relaxation of high-level beliefs” (Carhart-Harris, 2019), and this can be
unpacked in terms of a high Bayesian learning rate (Hohwy, 2017; Mathys et al.,
2014). Psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution, then, results in a collapse in temporal
thickness (Friston, 2018) of the self-model as conceived within an active inference
framework. The therapeutic effects of ego-dissolution, then, can be understood in
terms of the relaxing and retuning of entrenched self-models, or a “resetting” or
“opening” of the affordance landscape, allowing for the possibility of new modes
of engagement with the world, oneself, and other people.
Acknowledgments
Thanks very much to Mel Andrews, Andrew Corcoran, and Andy Clark for invaluable crit-
ical feedback and discussion in the production of this paper. Work on this article was sup-
ported by the European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant XSPECT - DLV-692739.
References
Adams, R. A., Stephan, K. E., Brown, H. R., Frith, C. D., & Friston, K. (2013). The computational anatomy of psychosis.
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 4, 47. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00047
Allen, M., & Friston, K. (2018). From cognitivism to autopoiesis: Towards a computational framework for the embodied
mind. Synthese, 195(6), 2459–2482. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5
Allen, M., & Tsakiris, M. (2018). The body as first prior: Interoceptive predictive processing and the primacy. InThe
Interoceptive Mind: From Homeostasis to Awareness (pp. 27–45). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811930.003.0002
Anchisi, D., & Zanon, M. (2015). A Bayesian perspective on sensory and cognitive integration in pain perception and
placebo analgesia. PloS One, 10(2), e0117270. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0117270
Apps, M. A., & Tsakiris, M. (2014). The free-energy self: A predictive coding account of self-recognition. Neuroscience &
Biobehavioral Reviews, 41, 85–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.01.029
Barlow, H. (2001). Redundancy reduction revisited. Network: Computation in Neural Systems, 12(3), 241–253.
https://doi.org/10.1088/0954-898x/12/3/301
Barre, A., Berthoux, C., De Bundel, D., Valjent, E., Bockaert, J., Marin, P., & Bécamel, C. (2016). Presynaptic serotonin 2A
receptors modulate thalamocortical plasticity and associative learning. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 113(10), E1382–E1391. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1525586113
Barrett, L. F. (2017). The theory of constructed emotion: An active inference account of interoception and categorization.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 12(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsw154
Barrett, L. F., Quigley, K. S., & Hamilton, P. (2016). An active inference theory of allostasis and interoception in depression.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 371(1708), 20160011.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0011
Barrett, L. F., & Simmons, W. K. (2015). Interoceptive predictions in the brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 16(7), 419–429.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3950
Bastos, A. M., Usrey, W. M., Adams, R. A., Mangun, G. R., Fries, P., & Friston, K. (2012). Canonical microcircuits for
predictive coding. Neuron, 76(4), 695–711. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.038
Bayne, T., & Carter, O. (2018). Dimensions of consciousness and the psychedelic state. Neuroscience of Consciousness,
2018(1), niy008. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niy008
Deane, G. (2020). Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 2. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.39
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
George Deane 22
Beliveau, V., Ganz, M., Feng, L., Ozenne, B., Højgaard, L., Fisher, P. M., et al. (2017). A high-resolution in vivo atlas of the
human brain’s serotonin system. Journal of Neuroscience, 37 (1), 120–128. https://doi.org/10.1038/sdata.2018.63
Berthoux, C., Barre, A., Bockaert, J., Marin, P., & Bécamel, C. (2018). Sustained activation of postsynaptic 5-HT2A
receptors gates plasticity at prefrontal cortex synapses. Cerebral Cortex, 29(4), 1659–1669.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhy064
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
13(1), 7–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003
Botvinick, M., & Toussaint, M. (2012). Planning as inference. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(10), 485–488.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.006
Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K. (2013). Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions.
Cognitive Processing, 14(4), 411–427. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3
Bruineberg, J. (2017). Active inference and the primacy of the ’I can’. In T. Metzinger & W. Wiese (Eds.), Philosophy and
predictive processing. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
Buckley, C. L., Kim, C. S., McGregor, S., & Seth, A. K. (2017). The free energy principle for action and perception: A
mathematical review. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 81, 55–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2017.09.004
Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 49–57.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004
Büchel, C., Geuter, S., Sprenger, C., & Eippert, F. (2014). Placebo analgesia: A predictive coding perspective. Neuron, 81(6),
1223–1239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2014.02.042
Cannon, W. B. (1927). The James-Lange theory of emotions: A critical examination and an alternative theory. The
American Journal of Psychology, 39(1/4), 106–124. https://doi.org/10.2307/1415404
Cannon, W. B. (1929). Organization for physiological homeostasis. Physiological Reviews, 9(3), 399–431.
https://doi.org/10.1152/physrev.1929.9.3.399
Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2019). How do psychedelics work? Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 32(1), 16–21.
https://doi.org/10.1097/yco.0000000000000467
Carhart-Harris, R. L., & Friston, K. (2019). REBUS and the anarchic brain: Toward a unified model of the brain action of
psychedelics. Pharmacological Reviews, 71(3), 316–344. https://doi.org/10.1124/pr.118.017160
Carhart-Harris, R. L., & Goodwin, G. M. (2017). The therapeutic potential of psychedelic drugs: Past, present, and future.
Neuropsychopharmacology, 42(11), 2105. https://doi.org/10.1038/npp.2017.84
Carhart-Harris, R. L., & Nutt, D. (2017). Serotonin and brain function: A tale of two receptors. Journal of
Psychopharmacology, 31(9), 1091–1120. https://doi.org/10.1177/0269881117725915
Carhart-Harris, R. L., Roseman, L., Haijen, E., Erritzoe, D., Watts, R., Branchi, I., & Kaelen, M. (2018). Psychedelics and the
essential importance of context. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 32(7), 725–731.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0269881118754710
Carter, O. L., Hasler, F., Pettigrew, J. D., Wallis, G. M., Liu, G. B., & Vollenweider, F. X. (2007). Psilocybin links binocular
rivalry switch rate to attention and subjective arousal levels in humans. Psychopharmacology, 195(3), 415–424.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-007-0930-9
Carter, O. L., Pettigrew, J. D., Hasler, F., Wallis, G. M., Liu, G. B., Hell, D., & Vollenweider, F. X. (2005). Modulating the rate
and rhythmicity of perceptual rivalry alternations with the mixed 5-HT 2A and 5-HT 1A agonist psilocybin.
Neuropsychopharmacology, 30(6), 1154. https://doi.org/10.1038/sj.npp.1300621
Cisek, P. (2007). Cortical mechanisms of action selection: The affordance competition hypothesis. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 362(1485), 1585–1599.
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511731525.015
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 36(3), 181–204. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x12000477
Clark, A. (2019). Consciousness as generative entanglement. The Journal of Philosophy, 116, 645–662.
https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20191161241
Clark, J. E., Watson, S., & Friston, K. (2018). What is mood? A computational perspective. Psychological Medicine, 48(14),
2277–2284. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0033291718000430
Conant, R. C., & Ashby, R. W. (1970). Every good regulator of a system must be a model of that system. International
Journal of Systems Science, 1(2), 89–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207727008920220
Corcoran, A., & Hohwy, J. (2018). Allostasis, interoception, and the free energy principle: Feeling our way forward.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811930.003.0015
Corcoran, A. W., Pezzulo, G., & Hohwy, J. (2019). From allostatic agents to counterfactual cognisers: Active inference,
biological regulation, and the origins of cognition. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201911.0083.v1
Deane, G. (2020). Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 2. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.39
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution 23
Corlett, P. R., Frith, C. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2009). From drugs to deprivation: A Bayesian framework for understanding
models of psychosis. Psychopharmacology, 206(4), 515–530. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-009-1561-0
Corlett, P. R., Honey, G. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2016). Prediction error, ketamine and psychosis: An updated model. Journal
of Psychopharmacology, 30(11), 1145–1155. https://doi.org/10.1177/0269881116650087
Craig, A. D. (2002). How do you feel? Interoception: The sense of the physiological condition of the body. Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 3(8), 655. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn894
Crapse, T. B., & Sommer, M. A. (2008). Corollary discharge across the animal kingdom. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9(8),
587. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2457
Damasio, A., & Carvalho, G. B. (2013). The nature of feelings: Evolutionary and neurobiological origins. Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 14(2), 143. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3403
Dayan, P., & Daw, N. D. (2008). Decision theory, reinforcement learning, and the brain. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral
Neuroscience, 8(4), 429–453. https://doi.org/10.3758/cabn.8.4.429
Eisenberger, N. I. (2012). The pain of social disconnection: Examining the shared neural underpinnings of physical and
social pain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 13(6), 421. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3231
Eisenberger, N. I., Jarcho, J. M., Lieberman, M. D., & Naliboff, B. D. (2006). An experimental study of shared sensitivity to
physical pain and social rejection. Pain, 126(1-3), 132–138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2006.06.024
Fanciullacci, M., Bene, E. D., Franchi, G., & Sicuteri, F. (1977). Phantom limb pain: Sub-hallucinogenic treatment with
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25). Headache: The Journal of Head and Face Pain, 17 (3), 118–119.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1526-4610.1977.hed1703118.x
Feldman, H., & Friston, K. (2010). Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4, 215.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2010.00215
Fletcher, P. C., & Frith, C. D. (2009). Perceiving is believing: A Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of
schizophrenia. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10(1), 48. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2536
Ford, J. M., Gray, M., Faustman, W. O., Roach, B. J., & Mathalon, D. H. (2007). Dissecting corollary discharge dysfunction in
schizophrenia. Psychophysiology, 44(4), 522–529. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2007.00533.x
Ford, J. M., & Mathalon, D. H. (2005). Corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia: Can it explain auditory
hallucinations? International Journal of Psychophysiology, 58(2-3), 179–189.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2005.01.014
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: A unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(2), 127.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2787
Friston, K. (2012a). Embodied inference and spatial cognition. Cognitive Processing, 13(1), 171–177.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-012-0519-z
Friston, K. (2012b). Prediction, perception and agency. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 83(2), 248–252.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2011.11.014
Friston, K. (2018). Am I self-conscious?(Or does self-organization entail self-consciousness?). Frontiers in Psychology, 9,
579. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00579
Friston, K., Daunizeau, J., Kilner, J., & Kiebel, S. J. (2010). Action and behavior: A free-energy formulation. Biological
Cybernetics, 102(3), 227–260. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00422-010-0364-z
Friston, K., Rigoli, F., Ognibene, D., Mathys, C., Fitzgerald, T., & Pezzulo, G. (2015). Active inference and epistemic value.
Cognitive Neuroscience, 6(4), 187–214. https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2015.1020053
Friston, K., Rosch, R., Parr, T., Price, C., & Bowman, H. (2018). Deep temporal models and active inference. Neuroscience &
Biobehavioral Reviews, 90, 486–501. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.04.009
Friston, K., Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T., Moutoussis, M., Behrens, T., & Dolan, R. J. (2013). The anatomy of choice:
Active inference and agency. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 598. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00598
Friston, K., Shiner, T., FitzGerald, T., Galea, J. M., Adams, R., Brown, H., et al. (2012). Dopamine, affordance and active
inference. PLoS Computational Biology, 8(1), e1002327. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327
Frith, U. (2003). Autism: Explaining the enigma. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Garrido, M. I., Kilner, J. M., Stephan, K. E., & Friston, K. (2009). The mismatch negativity: A review of underlying
mechanisms. Clinical Neurophysiology, 120(3), 453–463. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clinph.2008.11.029
Gershman, S. J. (2019). What does the free energy principle tell us about the brain? Neurons, Behavior, Data Analysis, and
Theory, 4(1), 1–10.
Girn, M., & Christoff, K. (2018). Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(11-12), 131–154. Retrieved from
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2018/00000025/f0020011/art00008
Griffiths, R. R., Johnson, M. W., Carducci, M. A., Umbricht, A., Richards, W. A., Richards, B. D., et al. (2016). Psilocybin
produces substantial and sustained decreases in depression and anxiety in patients with life-threatening cancer: A
randomized double-blind trial. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 30(12), 1181–1197.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0269881116675513
Deane, G. (2020). Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 2. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.39
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
George Deane 24
Grof, S. (1980). LSD psychotherapy. Pomona, CA: Hunter House.
Heinks-Maldonado, T. H., Mathalon, D. H., Houde, J. F., Gray, M., Faustman, W. O., & Ford, J. M. (2007). Relationship of
imprecise corollary discharge in schizophrenia to auditory hallucinations. Archives of General Psychiatry, 64(3),
286–296. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.64.3.286
Hendricks, P. S., Thorne, C. B., Clark, C. B., Coombs, D. W., & Johnson, M. W. (2015). Classic psychedelic use is associated
with reduced psychological distress and suicidality in the united states adult population. Journal of
Psychopharmacology, 29(3), 280–288. https://doi.org/10.1177/0269881114565653
Hesp, C., Smith, R., Allen, M., Friston, K., & Ramstead, M. (2019). Deeply felt affect: The emergence of valence in deep
active inference. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/62pfd
Hohwy, J. (2007). The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception. Psyche, 13(1), 1–20.
Hohwy, J. (2012). Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 96.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096
Hohwy, J. (2017). Priors in perception: Top-down modulation, Bayesian perceptual learning rate, and prediction error
minimization. Consciousness and Cognition, 47, 75–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.09.004
Hohwy, J., & Michael, J. (2017). Why should any body have a self? In F. de Vignemont & A. Alsmith (Eds.), The subject’s
matter: Self-consciousness and the body (pp. 363–391). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Huxley, A. (2010). The doors of perception: And heaven and hell. New York, NY: Random House.
Jakab, R. L., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1998). Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 95(2), 735–740.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.95.2.735
Kaplan, R., & Friston, K. (2018). Planning and navigation as active inference. Biological Cybernetics, 112(4), 323–343.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00422-018-0753-2
Keller, G. B., & Mrsic-Flogel, T. D. (2018). Predictive processing: A canonical cortical computation. Neuron, 100(2),
424–435. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2018.10.003
Kiebel, S. J., Daunizeau, J., & Friston, K. (2008). A hierarchy of time-scales and the brain. PLoS Computational Biology,
4(11), e1000209. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000209
King, A., Martin, I., & Seymour, K. (1972). Reversal learning facilitated by a single injection of lysergic acid diethylamide
(LSD 25) in the rat. British Journal of Pharmacology, 45(1), 161P. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1476-5381.1974.tb08611.x
Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2004). The Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation. Trends in
Neurosciences, 27 (12), 712–719. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007
Kometer, M., Cahn, B. R., Andel, D., Carter, O. L., & Vollenweider, F. X. (2011). The 5-HT2A/1A agonist psilocybin disrupts
modal object completion associated with visual hallucinations. Biological Psychiatry, 69(5), 399–406.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.10.002
Leary, T. F., Metzner, R., & Alpert, R. (1964). The psychedelic experience: A manual based on the Tibetan book of the dead.
Lebedev, A. V., Lövdén, M., Rosenthal, G., Feilding, A., Nutt, D. J., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2015). Finding the self by losing
the self: Neural correlates of ego-dissolution under psilocybin. Human Brain Mapping, 36(8), 3137–3153.
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22833
Letheby, C. (2020). Being for no-one: Psychedelic experience and minimal subjectivity. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences,
1(I), 5. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.47
Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2017). Self unbound: Ego dissolution in psychedelic experience. Neuroscience of Consciousness,
3(1), nix016. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/nix016
Limanowski, J., & Blankenburg, F. (2013). Minimal self-models and the free energy principle. Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, 7, 547. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547
Limanowski, J., & Friston, K. (2018). “Seeing the dark”: Grounding phenomenal transparency and opacity in precision
estimation for active inference. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 643. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643
Limanowski, J., & Friston, K. (2020). Attenuating oneself: An active inference perspective on “selfless” experiences.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 6. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.35
Ly, C., Greb, A. C., Cameron, L. P., Wong, J. M., Barragan, E. V., Wilson, P. C., et al. (2018). Psychedelics promote structural
and functional neural plasticity. Cell Reports, 23(11), 3170–3182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.celrep.2018.05.022
Lyons, T., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2018). More realistic forecasting of future life events after psilocybin for
treatment-resistant depression. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1721. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01721
Masters, R. E., & Houston, J. (1966). The varieties of psychedelic experience (Vol. 9289). New York, Chicago, San Francisco:
Holt, Rinehart; Winston New York.
Mathys, C., Daunizeau, J., Friston, K., & Stephan, K. E. (2011). A Bayesian foundation for individual learning under
uncertainty. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5, 39. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2011.00039
Deane, G. (2020). Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 2. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.39
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution 25
Mathys, C., Lomakina, E. I., Daunizeau, J., Iglesias, S., Brodersen, K. H., Friston, K., & Stephan, K. E. (2014). Uncertainty in
perception and the hierarchical gaussian filter. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 825.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00825
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T. (2009). The ego tunnel: The science of the mind and the myth of the self. New York: Basic Books.
Metzinger, T. (2017). The problem of mental action. In T. Metzinger & W. Wiese (Eds.), Philosophy and predictive
processing. Frankfurt am Mainz: MIND Group.
Metzinger, T. (2020). Minimal phenomenal experience: Meditation, tonic alertness, and the phenomenology of ”pure”
consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 7. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.46
Millière, R. (2017). Looking for the self: Phenomenology, neurophysiology and philosophical significance of drug-induced
ego dissolution. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 11, 245. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245
Millière, R. (2020). The varieties of selflessness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 8.
https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.48
Millière, R., Carhart-Harris, R. L., Roseman, L., Trautwein, F.-M., & Berkovich-Ohana, A. (2018). Psychedelics, meditation,
and self-consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1–29. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01475
Montague, P. R., & King-Casas, B. (2007). Efficient statistics, common currencies and the problem of reward-harvesting.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(12), 514–519. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.10.002
Moreno, F. A., Wiegand, C. B., Taitano, E. K., & Delgado, P. L. (2006). Safety, tolerability, and efficacy of psilocybin in 9
patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 67 (11), 1735–1740.
https://doi.org/10.4088/jcp.v67n1110
Morton, D. L., El-Deredy, W., Watson, A., & Jones, A. K. (2010). Placebo analgesia as a case of a cognitive style driven by
prior expectation. Brain Research, 1359, 137–141. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2010.08.046
Moutoussis, M., Fearon, P., El-Deredy, W., Dolan, R. J., & Friston, K. (2014). Bayesian inferences about the self (and others):
A review. Consciousness and Cognition, 25, 67–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.009
Mumford, D. (1992). On the computational architecture of the neocortex. Biological Cybernetics, 66(3), 241–251.
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00198477
Nour, M. M., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2017). Psychedelics and the science of self-experience. The British Journal of
Psychiatry, 210(3), 177–179. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.bp.116.194738
Nour, M. M., Evans, L., Nutt, D., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2016). Ego-dissolution and psychedelics: Validation of the
ego-dissolution inventory (EDI). Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 10, 269. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00269
Nutt, D. J., King, L. A., & Phillips, L. D. (2010). Drug harms in the UK: A multicriteria decision analysis. The Lancet,
376(9752), 1558–1565. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(10)61462-6
Ongaro, G., & Kaptchuk, T. J. (2019). Symptom perception, placebo effects, and the Bayesian brain. Pain, 160(1), 1.
https://doi.org/10.1097/j.pain.0000000000001367
Palhano-Fontes, F., Barreto, D., Onias, H., Andrade, K. C., Novaes, M. M., Pessoa, J. A., et al. (2019). Rapid antidepressant
effects of the psychedelic ayahuasca in treatment-resistant depression: A randomized placebo-controlled trial.
Psychological Medicine, 49(4), 655–663. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0033291718001356
Palmer, C. J., Lawson, R. P., & Hohwy, J. (2017). Bayesian approaches to autism: Towards volatility, action, and behavior.
Psychological Bulletin, 143(5), 521. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000097
Petitmengin, C. (2006). Describing one’s subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science
of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5(3-4), 229–269.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9022-2
Pezzulo, G. (2014). Why do you fear the bogeyman? An embodied predictive coding model of perceptual inference.
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(3), 902–911. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-013-0227-x
Pezzulo, G., Cartoni, E., Rigoli, F., Pio-Lopez, L., & Friston, K. (2016). Active inference, epistemic value, and vicarious trial
and error. Learning & Memory, 23(7), 322–338. https://doi.org/10.1101/lm.041780.116
Pezzulo, G., & Cisek, P. (2016). Navigating the affordance landscape: Feedback control as a process model of behavior and
cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(6), 414–424. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.013
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Friston, K. (2015). Active inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control.
Progress in Neurobiology, 134, 17–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pneurobio.2015.09.001
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Friston, K. (2018). Hierarchical active inference: A theory of motivated control. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 22(4), 294–306. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.009
Picard, F., & Friston, K. (2014). Predictions, perception, and a sense of self. Neurology, 83(12), 1112–1118.
https://doi.org/10.1212/wnl.0000000000000798
Deane, G. (2020). Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 2. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.39
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
George Deane 26
Pink-Hashkes, S., Rooij, I. van, & Kwisthout, J. (2017). Perception is in the details: A predictive coding account of the
psychedelic phenomenon. Proceedings of the 39th annual meeting of the cognitive science society, 2907–2912.
Preller, K. H., & Vollenweider, F. X. (2016). Phenomenology, structure, and dynamic of psychedelic states. In A. L.
Halberstadt, F. X. Vollenweider, & D. E. Nichols (Eds.), Behavioral neurobiology of psychedelic drugs (pp. 221–256).
https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2016_459
Ramachandran, V., Chunharas, C., Marcus, Z., Furnish, T., & Lin, A. (2018). Relief from intractable phantom pain by
combining psilocybin and mirror visual-feedback (MVF). Neurocase, 24(2), 105–110.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13554794.2018.1468469
Rao, R. P., & Ballard, D. H. (1999). Predictive coding in the visual cortex: A functional interpretation of some
extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nature Neuroscience, 2(1), 79. https://doi.org/10.1038/4580
Richards, W. A. (2015). Sacred knowledge: Psychedelics and religious experiences. New York: Columbia University Press.
Romano, A. G., Quinn, J. L., Li, L., Dave, K. D., Schindler, E. A., Aloyo, V. J., & Harvey, J. A. (2010). Intrahippocampal LSD
accelerates learning and desensitizes the 5-ht 2A receptor in the rabbit, romano et al. Psychopharmacology, 212(3),
441–448. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-010-2004-7
Roseman, L., Nutt, D. J., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2018). Quality of acute psychedelic experience predicts therapeutic
efficacy of psilocybin for treatment-resistant depression. Frontiers in Pharmacology, 8, 974.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fphar.2017.00974
Rösler, L., Rolfs, M., Van der Stigchel, S., Neggers, S. F., Cahn, W., Kahn, R. S., & Thakkar, K. N. (2015). Failure to use
corollary discharge to remap visual target locations is associated with psychotic symptom severity in schizophrenia.
Journal of Neurophysiology, 114(2), 1129–1136. https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00155.2015
Savage, C. (1955). Variations in ego feeling induced by D-lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25). Psychoanalytic Review,
42(1), 1–16.
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1963). Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state. Psychological
Review, 70(1), 121–122. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0038845
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2008). Episodic simulation of future events: Concepts, data, and applications.
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124(1), 39–60. https://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1440.001
Schulkin, J., & Sterling, P. (2019). Allostasis: A brain-centered, predictive mode of physiological regulation. Trends in
Neurosciences, 42(10), 740–752. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2019.07.010
Scott, G., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2019). Psychedelics as a treatment for disorders of consciousness. Neuroscience of
Consciousness, 2019(1), niz003. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niz003
Sebastián, M. Á. (2020). Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution: An analysis of (some) altered states of
consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 9. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.44
Seth, A. (2015). The cybernetic Bayesian brain: From interoceptive inference to sensorimotor contingencies. In T.
Metzinger & J. Windt (Eds.), Open MIND (pp. 1–24). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. (2016). Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 371(1708), 20160007. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0007
Seth, A. K., & Tsakiris, M. (2018). Being a beast machine: The somatic basis of selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
22(11), 969–981. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.08.008
Shadmehr, R., Smith, M. A., & Krakauer, J. W. (2010). Error correction, sensory prediction, and adaptation in motor
control. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 33, 89–108. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-neuro-060909-153135
Shipp, S. (2016). Neural elements for predictive coding. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1792.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01792
Siegel, E. H., Sands, M. K., Van den Noortgate, W., Condon, P., Chang, Y., Dy, J., et al. (2018). Emotion fingerprints or
emotion populations? A meta-analytic investigation of autonomic features of emotion categories. Psychological
Bulletin, 144(4), 343. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000128
Stephan, K. E., Manjaly, Z. M., Mathys, C., Weber, L. A., Paliwal, S., Gard, T., et al. (2016). Allostatic self-efficacy: A
metacognitive theory of dyshomeostasis-induced fatigue and depression. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 10, 550.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00550
Sterling, P. (2012). Allostasis: A model of predictive regulation. Physiology & Behavior, 106(1), 5–15.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physbeh.2011.06.004
Sterzer, P., Adams, R. A., Fletcher, P., Frith, C., Lawrie, S. M., Muckli, L., et al. (2018). The predictive coding account of
psychosis. Biological Psychiatry, 84(9), 634–643. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2018.05.015
Strassman, R. J. (1984). Adverse reactions to psychedelic drugs. A review of the literature. Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease, 172(10), 577–595. https://doi.org/10.1097/00005053-198410000-00001
Timmermann, C., Roseman, L., Schartner, M., Millière, R., Williams, L., Erritzoe, D., et al. (2019). Neural correlates of the
DMT experience as assessed via multivariate EEG. bioRxiv, 706283. https://doi.org/10.1101/706283
Deane, G. (2020). Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 2. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.39
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution 27
Timmermann, C., Spriggs, M. J., Kaelen, M., Leech, R., Nutt, D. J., Moran, R. J., et al. (2018). LSD modulates effective
connectivity and neural adaptation mechanisms in an auditory oddball paradigm. Neuropharmacology, 142, 251–262.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropharm.2017.10.039
Wager, T. D., Kang, J., Johnson, T. D., Nichols, T. E., Satpute, A. B., & Barrett, L. F. (2015). A Bayesian model of
category-specific emotional brain responses. PLoS Computational Biology, 11(4), e1004066.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004066
Wiese, W., & Metzinger, T. (2017). Vanilla PP for philosophers: A primer on predictive processing. In T. Metzinger & W.
Wiese (Eds.), Philosophy and predictive processing. https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958573024
Wilkinson, S., Deane, G., Nave, K., & Clark, A. (2019). Getting warmer: Predictive processing and the nature of emotion.
In L. Candiotto (Ed.),The value of emotions for knowledge (pp. 101–119). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15667-1
Yoshida, W., Dolan, R. J., & Friston, K. (2008). Game theory of mind. PLoS Computational Biology, 4(12), e1000254.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000254
Open Access
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, as long as you give appropriate credit
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license,
and indicate if changes were made.
Deane, G. (2020). Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 2. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.39
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
